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Abstract:
This inquiry seeks to establish that in his writings, Thorstein Veblen offers a
comprehensive and insightful contribution towards an understanding of instincts.
Instincts can be viewed self-regarding and thought to promote the survival of the
individual. Other instincts can be classified as group-regarding and contribute
towards the continuation of society. Instincts can lead to the formation of habits
and to combine to create societal institutions that govern human behavior. With
the passage of time, instincts, habits, and institutions are thought to contribute to
economic and societal evolution.
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This inquiry seeks to establish that in his writings, Thorstein Veblen offers a
comprehensive and insightful contribution towards an understanding of instincts.
Instincts define an individual’s tendency to take action and are core to evaluating
the motivation of a person’s thoughts and behavior. Habits form through instincts,
and combine to create societal institutions that govern human behavior. Instincts,
habits, and institutions all have the ability to evolve through the passage of time
and provide a methodology to analyze the underpinnings of human thinking,
choices, and behavior. Veblen combines the theories of neoclassical economics
and those of Karl Marx, defining a unique theory to explain evolutionary economic
cause and effect.

On Instincts
In Veblen in Plain English (2006), author Ken McCormick explores key ideas that
he has gleaned from contributions of Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929). McCormick
(2006, 18) explains that institutions are “… habitual methods of carrying on the
life process of the community.” In other words, human habits control the outcome
of how most people think and behave. Further, most people do not realize that
these habits exist because they are so deeply engrained within the human
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experience. McCormick (2006, 19) continues by defining that “common sense” is
as a fact, a manifestation of these habitual thought processes and actions.
According to McCormick (2006, 19-20), these habits of thought and action
originate from several sources throughout the lifetime of an individual. Starting in
childhood, and continuing through adulthood, we learn and assimilate habits
through the observation and instruction of others. This continual life process forms
the primal foundation of how an individual thinks and behaves. Specifically,
historical localized traditions that define what appropriate behavior is within a
nation, community, and family are the origin of most habits. Several historical
traditions including politics, religion, and observed public behavior, contribute to
forming these habitual ways of human thought and action. In combination, these
traditions blend to define a set of habitual autonomic norms that shape what an
individual views as right, wrong, true, or false within their societal group.
Not to be confused with habits, McCormick (2006, 6-7) defines “instincts”
as being innate primal human traits that define an individual’s propensity to take
action. Furthering this definition, these instincts are core, being persistently present
and cannot be further reduced or simplified. Opposed to human reflexive action
tropisms which require no thought; instincts from the Veblen perspective require
conscious thought, as they utilize the human propensity of action to direct the
behavior required for an individual to achieve a preconceived goal.
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Adding clarity, McCormick (2006, 7) describes and places instincts into two
broad classifications. One classification being self-regarding, and the other as
group-regarding. Self-regarding instincts focus only on the interests of the
individual, disregarding any effects to the group. Group-regarding instincts focus
on the best interests and continuation of the human species as a whole. Although
classified differently, these instincts are not mutually exclusive of each other.
There are cases where these classifications of instincts work together in tandem,
and cases in which they contradict in varying degrees. An evolutionary lens
provides a basic view into the interaction of self-regarding and group-regarding
instincts. Self-regarding instincts are required for an individual to survive;
however, the individual will not survive without the group. This potentially
diametric concept suggests that cooperation between individuals is an instinctual
intersection between these classifications, where cooperation is a necessity for the
continued survival of the self and of the group.
Specific group-regarding instincts are identified by McCormick (2006, 8-12)
as “parental bent,” “workmanship,” and “idle curiosity.” The instinct of parental
bent is the focus an individual places on nurturing and caring for younger and
weaker individuals within a given society to make life better for future generations.
The instinct of workmanship is the intrinsic desire to provide efficient, quality
output of completed work, and leaving little waste. Further, the instinct of
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workmanship aligns closely with the instinct of parental bent, as it provides the
necessary items for others within the society, including its youth. Lastly, the
group-regarding instinct of idle curiosity is simply a deep desire to know things
without consideration of utility. McCormick (2006, 11) professes that idle
curiosity is one of the most important forces of human evolution, as it alone has led
to the significant accumulation of knowledge to be used by societies of current and
future generations.
According to McCormick (2006, 12), “emulation” can also be considered as
an instinct as an instinct draws from Veblen’s writings. Through an examination
of an individual’s motivation to emulate, that being of the self, or society, the
emulation instinct can be included within both of the group-regarding and selfregarding classifications. The emulation instinct describes the human
characteristic to copy what they observe, and to make invidious comparisons.
Additionally, the emulation instinct is one of the most persistent, alert, and
strongest when related to economic motives.
Lastly, McCormick (2006, 14) describes self-regarding classifications as
“self-aggrandizement” and “predatory” instincts. The self-aggrandizement instinct
is the desire of an individual to preserve the self, but not always at the expense of
the instinct of parental bent. The predatory instinct is an innate desire of an
individual to dominate and feel superior to others.
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Instincts and Institutions
McCormick (2006, 1) introduces the concept that human behavior is the central
core of economics. This fact is visible in all economic systems, as each includes a
method describing how people behave. The foundations of these economic
systems have differing views regarding human behavior that significantly contrast
with the writings of Veblen.
Providing a simple view of human behavior, neoclassical economics defines
that all people, regardless of time or location seek only to maximize utility. This
line of thought means that individuals simply make decisions based on the pain or
pleasure they receive from their pool of available choices. Describing a
contrasting view, McCormick (2006, 2) explains that Veblen believes this
neoclassical view is absurd, as individuals are not simply reactive and passive
agents, but follow an individual’s collection of habits, expressing themselves and
evolving as choices present themselves. Further, Veblen clarifies his position by
arguing that if pleasure or pain did not exist—individuals would still make
choices—adding quite simply, that people do not first calculate their maximum
utility before making a choice.
In McCormick’s (2006, 3) reasoning, he describes neoclassical economics as
still purporting the assumption that maximizing utility drives the decision making
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of individuals, and as such, this view is claimed to sufficiently model and predict
economic behavior. Additionally, the neoclassical view is not concerned about
how realistic the model is in relation to human behavior; it only has to perform
well as a prediction tool. Though neoclassical modeling does well for these
predictions, it falls short in fundamentally analyzing how economic institutions
evolve.
Shifting his lens, McCormick (2006, 4) asserts that Karl Marx (1818-1883)
provided a popular alternate view of economics during the same era. Marx shared
the same fundamental interests as Veblen: however, he approached these questions
differently than neoclassical economists and Veblen. In the view of Marx,
circumstances that an individual dwells within determine how a person behaves.
For example, the owner of a business thinks and behaves differently than the
employee of a business, based solely on the unique experiences each of them have
had. Further, the social class that a person claims identity with determines the
predominant thinking and behavior patterns of that individual. Struggle occurs
when individuals in different social classes seek to protect what they have, or to
grow beyond where they are at a given time.
McCormick (2006, 4) continues describing his understanding of the views of
Marx by explaining that as time moves forward, the conditions of life change, and
with this, so do the social and material institutional constructs. An idea purported
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by Marx is that external conditions are responsible for forming how an individual
thinks, which in turn, changes the way people behave. This is quite the opposite
from the neoclassical view that assumes human nature is static and unchanging. In
more simplistic terms, Marx believes that “nurture” determines how an individual
thinks and behaves, where neoclassical economists regard a statically fixed
“nature” perspective defines human behavior.
Further identifying additional influences forming Veblen’s concept of
instincts and habits, William Waller (2017, 45-46) claims that the work of Jacques
Loeb (1859-1924) was the most important in forming Veblen’s views. Loeb
argued that instincts originate through neurological and physiological foundations,
a result of a stimulus causing a reflex reaction within the nervous system. Loeb
suggested the higher-order instincts were a linked series of automatic responses
that are associated with memories of repeated stimuli. Veblen took the idea that
instincts are of a biological origin from Loeb, however, he rejected the concept that
instincts or habits were automatic reflexive events.
Comparing the differing theories of Veblen’s predecessors and
contemporaries, McCormick (2006, 4-5) asserts that Veblen holds the most
complex view. Veblen’s belief is that these alternative viewpoints have validity,
however, not in and of themselves. These widely different views work together to
define how an individual behaves. Provided by nature, human instincts provide
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basic human tendencies that adapt over long evolutionary periods. Institutions
provide the nurturing element where social norms and learned habits take shape.
Veblen defines these two attributes—instincts and institutions—as working
together in an evolutionary construct. To summarize, the Veblenian view is that
human instincts evolve, institutions evolve, and both work together to influence the
motivational behavior of individuals.

Towards a Veblenian Economics
In their textbook, Principles of Microeconomics 2E (2018), authors Steven
Greenlaw and David Shapiro share their knowledge of the neoclassical view of
economics. Greenlaw and Shapiro (2018, 28) explain that people are constrained
to the consumption choices they can make based on their individual pecuniary
means. In other words, each individual has limited income, and can only spend
what they have to satisfy their wants and needs. Neoclassical economics defines
this concept as an individual’s “budget constraint.”
Further defining neoclassical reasoning on how individual’s make
consumption choices, Greenlaw and Shaprio (2018, 29) examine the theory of
“opportunity cost.” Opportunity cost, as defined, states that for an individual to
obtain something, that individual must sacrifice something else. In other words,
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the act of consuming one thing is a lost opportunity for the consumption of
something else. This concept, combined with the individual’s budget constraint
provides neoclassical economists with the basis for a mathematically linear method
to analyze and explain how and why people make consumption choices.
Considering this linear method, Greenlaw and Shaprio (2018, 32) discuss a
rigid concept in which claims that all individuals use “rational” thinking when
making subjective consumption choices. This notion infers that all individuals
perform an examination of the costs and benefits for the selection of a good to
consume prior to making a choice. Assuming that people compare the total
benefits against the total costs, neoclassical economists claim that all people
analyze how the benefits change when comparing between the available options to
choose. Used throughout neoclassical economics, this “marginal analysis” method
represents a primary component of the associated theories within this neoclassical
school of thought.
Neoclassical economics uses this marginal analysis method to define the
consumption selection process as centered on the “satisfaction” one receives from
a good and is considered the “utility” that the good provides to the individual. In
other words, individuals only consider how much pain vs. pleasure one receives
from a good when making choices. There is an assumption that as one consumes
more of a good, one obtains more utility, such as eating pizza. While conversely,
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the utility received after consuming the initial unit is higher than the received
utility of consuming later units of that good. This phenomenon—defined by
neoclassical economics—is the “law of diminishing marginal utility.”
Using the previously discussed method of marginal analysis, Greenlaw and
Shaprio (2018, 226) purport that neoclassical economic production also uses this
method to decide how many units of a good to manufacture to maximize profit.
Marginal profit determines the number of units of a good produced by a firm.
Calculated by subtracting the marginal revenue from the marginal cost, the
resulting marginal profit value determines if additional production is required.
Producing one more unit of a good continues until the marginal profit becomes
negative, where the firm would then endure pecuniary losses. The ideal number of
units to produce is determined where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal
revenue of a good.
In his “The Limitations of Marginal Utility,” published in the Journal of
Political Economy 17, no. 9, Veblen discusses his views on neoclassical economic
theory. Veblen (1909, 620) accepts that the neoclassical methodology of marginal
utility provides a static view based on the valuation of the consumption and
production of goods; however, Veblen argues this is a limited view, and not an
adequate tool to use in explaining how or why individuals choose between
differing consumption goods. Additionally, Veblen is irked at the use of the term
10	
  
	
  

“dynamic” in neoclassical reasoning as he claims that none of the theories provides
any definition of movement, or evolution that occurs within the reality of economic
life. Specifically, Veblen views this methodology as teleology, as in use for terms
of their purpose, rather than seeking their cause.
Veblen (1909, 621-622) continues his argument against neoclassical
economics as it does not explain cause and effect, growth, or deal with change
within any of its primary theories. Further, when one discusses institutional
phenomenon, cultural change, or evolutionary events within a guild of neoclassical
economists, they present a denial or alternate explanation, taking for granted the
observed reality of evolving institutions and related habits that govern human
behavior; not seeking its cause. Veblen shares that he understands that followers
of this school are intelligent and have access to a wealth of information, but
chastises the thinking that marginal utility, originating from pecuniary interests and
events are the main driving factor for an individual’s economic choices.
Veblen (1909, 623) writes that the assertion that an individual’s anticipated
experience of pleasure or pain as the sole factor used in deciding which
consumption good to acquire, is at best, an optimistic assumption. Meaning that
there are significant differences between individuals, and with this, different levels
of tolerance in what defines pleasure and pain. Human behavior can be rational
and irrational; the neoclassical school only works with rational behavior, and
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provides no definition in how to account for observed irrational economic events
that occur. Constant change is a fact of economic life, and with these changes,
external events occur that create a myriad of stresses on an individual. These
stresses can cause irrationality of thought, leaving neoclassical economic theories
unable to provide an accurate prediction using their mathematical models.
Considering social and cultural institutions, Veblen (1909, 624-625)
considers the unwavering economic concepts of free contract and ownership as
being claimed as a form of natural rights in the neoclassical school of thought.
These rights—believed to be an absolute—with no need to question their need or
validity—places a strict confinement of deductive reasoning of economic theory
rather than examining the efficient cause. Two methods are available to reach a
conclusion through reasoning and evidence: one through sufficient reasoning and
the other though finding the cause. Both of these methods are significantly
different from each other, and one cannot efficiently convert the results from one
method to the other. The inevitable result on placing a primary focus on reasoning
and evidence, or deduction, has resulted in the neoclassical view. Focusing on the
cause and effect of events is the realm of the historical, institutional economic
view.
Veblen (1909, 635-636) concludes his thoughts on the limitations of
marginal utility by explaining that pecuniary concepts drive business and economic
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life through courses and cycles of booms and busts. It is through these cycles that
institutional change occurs, distinguishing the character of business eras from the
crude, to the modern. To ignore or toss aside the idea that evolving instincts,
habits, and institutions are a critical aspect of economic theory, is to impede the
acquisition of a deeper understanding of human behavior that is required in
economics.

Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that in his writings, Thorstein Veblen offers a
comprehensive and insightful contribution towards an understanding of instincts.
Through an expository view of instincts, habits, and institutions, we have
established that instincts form the primary base of human thinking and behavior.
Additionally, through the exploration of neoclassical, Loeb, and Marxist theories,
clarification now exists in which Veblenian economic views were born using a
combination of these distinctly different schools of thought. Veblenian economics
goes beyond static analysis by contributing to a deeper understanding of how
individuals make consumption choices, and what motivates them in making these
decisions.
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